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I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions, Classen Immunotherapies,
Inc. v. Biogen Idec.1 and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar,2
have created an intra-circuit split regarding the scope of the Hatch-
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See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
2
See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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Waxman Act’s3 “safe harbor” provision. The safe harbor protects
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers from patent infringement claims
by the brand-name pharmaceutical patent holder if the patented
techniques are used for required submissions to the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), usually to obtain FDA approval.4 In the past,
the issue with interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision has been
exclusively related to pre-market approval activities. Classen and
Momenta address whether the safe harbor provision extends to activities
after the generic drug has been approved. The panels deciding the two
cases used different reasoning and ultimately came to two different
conclusions; the Classen panel used the legislative history of the statute
to interpret the scope of the safe harbor provision to exclude post-FDAapproval methods, while the Momenta panel used only the statutory text
to interpret the statute to conclude that the scope of the safe harbor does
include post-FDA-approval methods. These conflicting decisions have
created uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry and the issue needs to
be resolved.
This Comment discusses the negative impact that the uncertainty of
the safe harbor’s scope will have on the pharmaceutical industry. Part II
of this Comment details the background of the Hatch-Waxman safe
harbor provision and how it influences the seemingly conflicting
outcomes in Classen and Momenta. Part III then addresses the
implications these decisions will have on the future of generic drugs and
the uncertainty that they create in the industry, and it will also suggest
possible temporary and long-term solutions to this uncertainty.
Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the best way to define the scope
of the safe harbor provision is to have Congress address the issue through
statutory amendment to clarify its limits and specifically state whether it
applies to post-approval activities; however, a short-term solution is to
have the FDA set forth a guidance for the industry to clarify its opinion
on the issue.

3
35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) (2010). The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, is informally known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.”
4
See id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Drug Approval Process and Patent Implications
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) regulates the
manufacture, use, and sale of drugs.5 For a drug to enter the market, the
FDCA requires that the FDA approve it by determining that it is safe and
effective.6 For a pharmaceutical manufacturer to obtain this approval, it
must submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the FDA.7 This
process requires multiple stages and usually takes many years to
complete.8
During the first stage—the preclinical stage—a
pharmaceutical sponsor tests the toxicology of the drug by performing
synthesis and purification, as well as some limited testing on animals.9
This stage usually takes three to four years.10 After the completion of the
drug’s preclinical testing, the manufacturer moves ahead to the clinical
stage, which requires an Investigative New Drug Application (“IND”)
and three clinical phases.11 Phase I tests the safety of the drug by
conducting clinical trials on healthy individuals; Phase II tests the safety,
dosing, and efficacy through administering the drug to volunteers in the
target population; and Phase III tests the safety, efficacy, and side effects
of the drug.12 This stage is incredibly lengthy and spans between 6 and
11 years.13 Once that is completed, the manufacturer submits the NDA.14
The NDA explains the results of the clinical trials and sets forth the
ingredients of the new drug, how it is manufactured, and how it works.15
The FDA evaluates the drug safety, effectiveness, and labeling to
determine whether it will be approved.16 Once the drug has obtained
approval, it can be marketed with FDA regulated labeling.17 The entirety

5

21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 355(a) (Lexis 2013).
Id.
7
21 U.S.C.A. §355 (Lexis 2013).
8
See Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval
Process, J AM BOARD FAM MED (2001), www.medscape.com/viewarticle/405869.
9
Synthesis of the drug is the composition process, or putting together the
compounds to make the drug. Purification is the process of removing impurities in the
chemical components of the drug. 21 U.S.C.A. §355 (Lexis 2013).
10
See Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 8.
11
21 U.S.C.A. §355 (Lexis 2013).
12
Id.
13
See Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 8.
14
Id.
15
21 C.F.R. §314 (Lexis 2013).
16
Id.
17
Id.
6

442

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:439

of this FDA approval process can take anywhere from eleven to fourteen
years.18
The lengthy time period required for FDA approval creates
implications for both brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and
generic manufacturers, which is what the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to
fix. Before Hatch-Waxman, the time necessary to obtain FDA approval
consumed a large portion of the patent life of the brand-name drug, while
the extent of time and money that a manufacturer had to invest to obtain
approval was a significant disincentive to generic manufacturers.19
While the brand-name manufacturer holds the patent for the drug,
generic companies are prohibited from selling the generic version on the
market. This gives the brand-name drug company patent exclusivity of
the drug for the life of the patent. Brand-name manufacturers lost some
of these exclusivity benefits because the process required the
manufacturers to conduct lengthy clinical trials and await regulatory
review before being able to place the drug on the market.20 This long
process cut significantly into the limited term of the patent and, as a
result, the patentee drug manufacturers “were unable to profit from their
invention’s market exclusivity . . . limiting the economic advantage the
patentees could derive from their temporary monopoly.”21 On the other
end, there was little incentive for manufacturers to develop generic drugs
because they were required to wait until after the patent term for the
brand name drug ended to initiate the lengthy FDA approval process.22
This lengthy FDA approval process created economic disadvantages for
both the brand-name and generic manufacturers, highlighting the
intersection between patent law and FDA regulation.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers regularly seek patents for both their
new and generic drug products. A patent gives the holder the “right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing the patented invention for the term of the patent.”23 This is
designed to give pharmaceutical companies incentive to invest in
researching and developing new products.24 Section 271(a) of the Hatch18

2014).
19

U.S. FOOD

AND

DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.org (last visited May 15,

Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman (Im)Balancing Act, HARVARD LEDA, 28
(2003).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
35 U.S.C. 154 (Lexis 2013).
24
Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman (Im)Balancing Act, HARVARD LEDA, 28
(2003).
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Waxman Act states that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent
therefore, infringes the patent.”25 However, § 271 also creates an
exemption to this rule of infringement. The Act was executed to amend
the FDCA to address “the need for innovative new pharmaceuticals and
the availability of less expensive generic drugs.”26 The Act facilitates
generic entry in the pharmaceutical market by making it easier for
manufacturers to obtain FDA approval in a shorter period of time.27
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic market was neither
prevalent nor profitable.28 The generic drug company was required to
submit an NDA with results of studies conducted to show the safety and
effectiveness of the drug, even though the brand-name drug manufacturer
already submitted similar safety and effectiveness studies.29 The
extensive time and costs required for generic drug manufacturers to gain
FDA approval made it unlikely that the manufacturer would recover its
investment.
This was a huge disincentive for pharmaceutical
manufacturers to invest in developing generic drugs.30
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., which
prohibited competitors from performing tests required for FDA approval
using patented methods until those patents expired.31 This ruling
prevented generic manufacturers from beginning testing on the drug until
the brand-name manufacturer’s patent expired, which “resulted in the
generic not being able to obtain FDA approval until about two years
following the expiration of the brand innovator’s patent.”32 Congress
enacted the Hatch-Waxman to overrule Roche.33 Title I of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 sets out the procedure for the Abbreviated New Drug Applications
(“ANDAs”). This abbreviated procedure allows a generic manufacturer
to take advantage of the brand-name manufacturer’s lengthy clinical
research procedures. The approval process is expedited, allowing them
to enter the market much faster than if they had to go through the clinical
25

35 U.S.C. 271(a) (Lexis 2013).
SCHACHT, WENDY H. & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG, RESEARCH SERV., RL31379, THE
“HATCH-WAXMAN” ACT: SELECT PATENT-RELATED ISSUES, Summary (2002).
27
Id at 2.
28
Kristen E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests of
Survival of the Fittest? 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 249 (2002).
29
Id. at 250.
30
Id. at 249.
31
733 F. 2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
32
Behrendt, supra note 26, at 250.
33
H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984).
26
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research process that new drugs must complete, because they are now
able to enter the market as soon as the patent expires.34
Section 505(j) of the FDCA addresses the abbreviated process for
FDA approval of generic bioequivalent drugs.35 This provision allows
manufacturers to file an ANDA, which rely on the original
manufacturer’s safety and efficacy test results.36 The provisions of the
ADNA do not require the generic manufacturer to submit its own safety
and effectiveness studies.37 Instead, the manufacturer must submit
information showing that the generic has the same active ingredients,
dosage form, route of administration, and strength as the pioneer drug
that the FDA has already approved.38 The ANDA also requires the
generic manufacturer to show that the generic drug is bioequivalent to
the approved drug.39 If a generic manufacturer can show bioequivalence
between the generic drug and the pioneer drug, the FDA can approve the
drug without the proof of safety or efficacy required for NDAs.40 Under
the ANDA procedure, a drug is “bioequivalent” if:
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of
the listed drug . . . or (ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does
not show a significant difference from the extent of absorption of
the listed drug . . . and the difference from the listed drug in the
rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its
proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective
body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is considered
medically insignificant for the drug.41

The bioequivalency requirement for the ANDA, rather than safety
and efficacy tests that the NDA requires, allows the generic to be able to
receive FDA approval much faster.42 The Act attempts to balance the
competing interests discussed above by extending the length of the patent
term for brand-name manufacturers to restore some of the term that was
lost due to clinical testing, while allowing generic manufacturers to
34
See ALLAN M. FOX & ALAN R. BENNET, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DRUG
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, iii-iv (1987).
35
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 505(j) (Lexis 2013).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. A generic drug is bioequivalent if it contains the same active ingredient as the
original. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (Lexis 2013).
41
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(8)(B) (Lexis 2013).
42
See Karbalai, supra note 19.
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obtain FDA approval during the patent period (without being subject to
infringement) and enter the market as soon as the patent expires.43
In addition to its creation of ANDAs, Congress included a Safe
Harbor in the Hatch-Waxman Act to further intentivize creation of new
drugs as well as increase the public’s access to cheaper generic drugs.44
The safe harbor provides that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.45

The language of the statute leaves room for ambiguity and
interpretation of certain terms by the courts. “The terms in the statutory
language differ in certain respects from those in other provisions of the
Act . . . [s]everal words and phrases . . . raised several important
questions that were left to the courts to determine.”46 Specifically, the
terms “solely,” “reasonably related,” and “development and submission
of information” have required courts to contemplate how the statute
should be interpreted.47
Hatch-Waxman’s legislative history provides helpful insight into
the intended meaning of the statutory language. The legislature strove to
“restore[] patent terms to pharmaceutical inventions in order to offset the
lengthy waiting period prior to receiving FDA pre-market approval to
sell a new drug” and “permit[] generic companies to use the patented
products in preparing their applications for similar regulatory approval
before the patent terms expire so that brand companies cannot enjoy a
longer monopoly than allowed by the patent statute.”48 Excerpts from the
congressional record indicate that the limited purpose of the safe harbor
provision was to facilitate the generic drug application process to the
FDA for approval. During this process, the generic manufacturer must
submit data to the FDA to establish bioequivalence, and further:
In order to complete this application, the generic manufacturer
must conduct certain drug tests. In order to complete this type of
43

Id.
Id.
45
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010).
46
Karbalai, supra note 19, at 28.
47
Id.
48
Chenwei Wang, In Search of the Boundary of the Safe Harbor, 19 FED. CIR. B.J.
617 (2010).
44
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testing, section 202 of the bill creates general exception to the
rules of patent infringement. Thus, a generic manufacturer may
obtain a supply of a patented drug product during the life of the
patent and conduct tests using that product if the purpose of those
tests is to submit an application for FDA approval.49

The legislative history also suggests that the safe harbor is intended
to allow for activities only in preparation for commercial activity. In a
House floor debate, Representative Kastenmeier stated that “[t]he
purpose of sections 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that experimentation
with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for
commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not
patent infringement.”50 Congress intended only minimal interference
with a patent holder’s rights through application of this provision. As
stated in the House Report: “[T]he only activity which will be permitted
by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers
can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute . . . thus, the
nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder is not
substantial.”51 Congress had several concerns regarding the safe harbor
provision during the enactment process, including “[t]aking property
rights away from people and away from companies”52 and
“compromis[ing] the rights of present patent holders by permitting their
adverse use of that particular product by potential competitors prior to
the time that the patent expires.”53 There were also concerns that this
leniency on patent infringement would contradict the United States’
position on the importance of patent rights.54
B. The Supreme Court’s Variant Interpretations of the “Safe Harbor”
Provision
The difficulty of interpreting the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is
apparent through both the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s varying
decisions. There have been several recent Supreme Court cases that have
addressed the interpretation of the scope of § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor
provision, including Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.55 and Merck
49
130 Cong. Rec. at H8708, (Aug. 4, 1984) (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier)
(emphasis added).
50
Id. (emphasis added).
51
H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984).
52
130 Cong. Rec. at H8710 (Aug. 4, 1984) (statement of Rep. Michael DeWine).
53
130 Cong. Rec. at H8710 (Aug. 4, 1984) (statement of Rep. William Moorhead).
54
See generally Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
55
496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.56 Both of these cases addressed premarketing approval mechanisms.57 In Eli Lilly, the Court interpreted
§ 271(e)(1) to extend to medical devices as well as drugs, based on the
plain language of the statute.58 This was a departure from the decision
below, where the Federal Circuit decided the case by using the legislative
history to interpret the meaning of the statute.59 In contrast, the Supreme
Court initially looked at the legislative history but ultimately disregarded
it, reasoning that if the legislative intent was to single out drugs, “there
were available infinitely more clear and simple ways of expressing that
intent.”60
The decision broadened the scope of the safe harbor
provision by holding that § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the
“use of patented inventions reasonably related to the development and
submission of information needed to obtain marketing approval of
medical devices under the FDCA.”61
In Merck, the Supreme Court again broadened the scope of the safe
harbor provision. Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit majority opinion by Judge Rader argued that the legislative
history and intent of the provision is clear, and interpreted the meaning
of the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related” narrowly by focusing
on the word “solely.”62 The Supreme Court, rather than focusing its
attention on the word “solely,” hung its analysis on a broad interpretation
of the term “reasonably related.”63 This significantly broadened the scope
of the safe harbor provision to include pre-clinical experiments used to
develop new drugs, not just generics, if they are regularly submitted to
the FDA to get approval.64 The Court also held that the safe harbor
applies even when the experiments are not ultimately submitted to the
FDA, as long as they are relevant to the submissions.65 This broad
interpretation of the safe harbor provision protects “all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission
of any information under the FDCA.”66 Based on the Supreme Court’s
apparent difficulty in interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision,
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

545 U.S. 193 (2005).
See generally Merck, 545 U.S. 193; Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661.
496 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 668–69.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 661.
See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205 (2005).
Id. at 204–05.
Id.
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 202 (emphasis in original).
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there is clearly some ambiguity in the language of § 271(e)(1), as well as
disparity between the legislative history and the plain language of the
statute, which has led to uncertainty as to the true scope of the provision.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Recent Inconsistency Regarding the “Safe
Harbor’s” Application to Post-FDA Approval Activities
A major uncertainty that has arisen due to the safe harbor’s
ambiguity is whether it applies to post-FDA approval activities. Eli Lilly
and Merck focused on only pre-approval activities.67 However, there
have been two recent Federal Circuit cases addressing the post-approval
issue.68
These issues arise when the FDA requires the drug
manufacturers to produce information even after the drug has been
approved. A review of the cases demonstrates that the Federal Circuit
has produced contradicting opinions and different methods of
interpretation to resolve factually similar disputes.69
In Classen, Classen alleged that Biogen and GlaxoSmithKline
(collectively “Biogen”) infringed on its patent by participating in studies
linking the timing of childhood vaccines to the development of certain
diseases, because Classen owned the patent to Biogen’s methods.70
Classen argued that § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor provision is limited to
“activities conducted to obtain pre-marketing approval of generic
counterparts of patented inventions, before patent expiration.”71 Biogen
contended that its reporting to the FDA the results from the studies fell
squarely within the safe harbor provision.72 Judges Rader and Newman
wrote the majority opinion, agreeing with Classen that the safe harbor
provision “does not apply to information that may be routinely reported
to the FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained.”73 In
coming to its conclusion, the majority discussed the legislative history of
the Hatch-Waxman Act. The court pointed to the House Report, that
provided that “it is not an act of patent infringement for a generic drug
maker to import or to test a patented drug in preparation for seeking FDA
67

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See generally Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
69
See generally Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
70
Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
68
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approval if marketing of the drug would occur after expiration of the
patent.”74 The court found that the House Report makes it clear that “the
legislation concerns [only] premarketing approval of generic drugs,”
specifically citing the Report’s statement that “[t]he information which
can be developed under this provision is the type which is required to
obtain approval of the drug.”75 Importantly, “[t]he Report states that ‘the
generic manufacturer is not permitted to market the patented drug during
the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is test the drug for
purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval.’”76
The dissent, written by Judge Moore, disagreed with the majority’s
reliance on the legislative history of the Act to interpret the scope of the
safe harbor provision. Judge Moore argued that the majority’s
interpretation is “contrary to the plain language of the statute and
Supreme Court precedent.”77 He suggested that by looking at the plain
language, the statute does not limit the safe harbor to exclusively preFDA-approval.78 He relied on the Court’s decision in Merck, which
provided that:
There is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain
information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of
research in which it is developed or the particular submission in
which it could be included . . . [Congress] exempted from
infringement all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably related’
to the process of developing information for submission under
any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of
drugs.79

Moore suggested that the majority relied too heavily on the
legislative history. It is undisputed that the safe harbor covers preapproval activity, but the legislative history does not address whether it
covers more than that. “The language Congress chose to enact and that
was signed into law by the President is plain on its face.”80 Simply put,

74
Id. at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648).
75
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2648).
76
Classen, 659 F.3d at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 30 (1984),
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648).
77
Id. at 1083 (Moore, J., dissenting).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1083 (emphasis in original) (citing Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005)).
80
Id.
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“[t]here is no ‘pre-approval’ limitation.”81 Moore argued that the plain
language of the statute is broader than the majority concluded through its
reliance on the legislative history.82 He ultimately concluded that Biogen
was not required by the FDA to perform the specific infringing studies,
and “the general administration of drugs or vaccines is not reasonably
related to post-approval reporting activities.”83 Since the activities in
question were not “reasonably related” to the submission of data to the
FDA they were not protected under the safe harbor provision.84
Following this decision by the Federal Circuit, GlaxoSmithKline filed a
petition for certiorari to have this decision reviewed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, which was denied on January 14, 2013.85
The issue in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was whether patented techniques used to test the
bioequivalence of generic drugs to generate data required by the FDA
after the drug has been approved is protected under the safe harbor
provision of § 271(e)(1).86 The drug in question is a generic version of
Lovenox (enoxaparin), which prevents blood clots.87 This drug is made
of a unique set of molecules, creating complications when submitting an
ANDA, given the difficulty establishing that the generic has the same
active ingredients as the existing drug.88 The FDA provided criteria (or
“standards for identity”) for generic manufacturers to show that generic
enaxoparin has the same active ingredients as Lovenox, and it suggested
multiple techniques for this testing.89 Amphastar filed an ANDA for
generic enoxaparin in March 2003 and obtained FDA approval to market
the drug in September 2011.90 Amphastar was the first generic
Subsequently,
manufacturer to file an ANDA for enoxaparin.91
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Sandoz, Inc. (collectively
“Momenta”) obtained FDA approval in July 2010 and were the first to
actually bring the drug to the market.92 Momenta patented the “methods
for
analyzing
heterogeneous
populations
of
sulfated
81

Id.
Classen, 659 F.3d at at 1083–84.
83
Id. at 1084.
84
Id.
85
GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013) (mem).
86
See Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1348-51
(Fed. Cir. 2012)
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1349–50.
89
Id. at 1350–51.
90
Id. at 1351.
91
Id.
92
Id.
82
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polysaccharides . . . ‘for the presence or amount of a non-naturally
occurring sugar . . . that results from a method of making enoxaparin.’”93
As the only generic on the market, Momenta’s sale of enoxaparin
generated over a billion dollars per year, largely because of the lack of
competition.94
Momenta alleged patent infringement because
Amphastar used Momenta’s patented methods to analyze enoxaparin
samples for manufacturing it for commercial sale.95 Amphastar argued
that the allegedly infringing method of testing is protected § 271(e)(1)’s
safe harbor.96
The district court held that “the alleged infringing activity involves
the use of plaintiffs’ patented quality control testing methods on each
commercial batch of enoxaparin that will be sold after FDA approval,”
and concluded that the safe harbor does not apply.97 The court focused
on the legislative history of the safe harbor provision and specifically
referenced Classen to support its decision.98 Amphastar appealed,
arguing that the ruling construed the safe harbor provision too narrowly,
and suggested that the plain language of the statute does not preclude
post-FDA-approval activities.99 On appeal, Momenta relied on Classen
to urge affirmance of the district court’s ruling, arguing that, “[i]n
Classen, this court squarely held that ‘[t]he [safe harbor] does not apply
to information that may be routinely reported to the FDA long after
marketing approval has been obtained.’”100 Momenta additionally
argued that the FDA does not require the particular patented procedure,
so the safe harbor should not apply because there are other acceptable
testing methods available.101
In Momenta, Judgees Moore and Dyk comprised the majority,
while Judge Rader wrote a lengthy dissent. Notably, Judge Moore wrote
the dissent in Classen and Judge Rader wrote the majority opinion.
93
Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351 (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,575,886 col. 4 II. 53-55 (filed
2009-08-18)).
94
Id. at 1351.
95
Id. at 1352.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1353 (citing J.A. 31).
98
Id. at 1353 (“[A]lthough the safe harbor provision permits otherwise infringing
activity that is conducted to obtain regulatory approval of a product, it does not permit a
generic manufacturer to continue in that otherwise infringing activity after obtaining such
approval.”).
99
Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1353.
100
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Sandoz, Inc. at 43,
686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2012-1062) (quoting Classen Immunotherapies, Inc.
v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
101
Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1353.
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Here, the majority looked at the language of the statute to determine the
scope of Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provision.102 The majority looked
at the text of the provision and did not find any ambiguity, stating that
“Congress could not have been clearer in its choice of words: as long as
the use of the patented invention is solely for uses ‘reasonably related’ to
developing and submitting information pursuant to ‘a Federal law’
regulating the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs, it is not ‘an act of
infringement.’”103
The majority posited that although the provision was enacted in the
context of the ANDA approval process, Congress used “flexible and
expansive” language rather than specifically referencing the ANDA
portion of the FDCA.104 The majority asserted that if Congress had
intended the provision to be limited exclusively to information submitted
pursuant to the FDCA, it would have used more specific language to
indicate that intention.105 In other parts of the statute, there are
limitations based on the FDCA that are expressly referenced, such as
§ 271(e)(2), whereas there are no express references to the FDCA in the
safe harbor provision.106 The majority stated that it “will not import the
limitation of § 271(e)(2) into § 271(e)(1)” because the latter “applies to
any use of a patented invention as long as the use is ‘reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.’”107 Comparing
the inclusion of limitations in § 271(e)(2) to the lack of language
indicating a limitation in § 271(e)(1), the majority interpreted Congress’s
lack of a limitation in § 271(e)(1) to be intentional.108 It stated: “When
the intent of Congress is expressed so clearly and consistently throughout
the statute, there is neither need nor the occasion to refer to the
legislative history.”109 The majority insisted that the legislative history is
irrelevant in determining the scope of the safe harbor provision because
Congress would have included language to limit the provision to preapproval activities if it intended that the provision be so limited.110
The majority found that the scope of the safe harbor extends
beyond activities related to information submitted in an ANDA so long
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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as the activity is for “uses reasonably related” to the development and
submission of information in an ANDA.111 The majority compared this
interpretation to the Supreme Court’s conclusions in Eli Lilly and Merck,
in which the Court relied on the statutory language rather than the
legislative history to interpret § 271(e)(1). It specifically suggested that
the Court in Merck explicitly rejected the notion that the safe harbor was
limited to “the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic drug.”112
The majority ultimately determined that the information obtained
by Amphastar using the patented technique is information “submitted”
for purposes of the statute.113 In response to Momenta’s contention that
the information obtained using the patented technique was not
“submitted” to the FDA, “but rather was retained by the ANDA holder,”
the majority concluded that the FDA requires that this type of
information be retained by the manufacturer for each batch of the generic
drug produced for one year, and the FDA has the authority to inspect
those records at any time for continued approval.114 The majority stated:
We think that the requirement to maintain records for FDA
inspection satisfies the requirement that the uses be reasonably
related to the development and submission of information to the
FDA . . . the fact that the FDA does not in most cases actually
inspect the records does not change the fact that they are for the
‘development and submission of information under a federal
law.’115

The court cited Merck to support its conclusion that there is no
infringement when “there [was] a reasonable basis for believing that the
experiments [would] produce the types of information that are relevant to
an IND or NDA,” regardless of whether that information was actually
submitted to the FDA.116
Notably, the majority found it necessary to distinguish the case
from the decision in Classen a year earlier. The majority posited that the
FDA did not mandate the specific studies at issue in Classen; instead,
only the information about adverse side effects acquired as a result of the
studies (which used the patented method) was required by the FDA.117 It
111
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found that this case “fits well within Classen because the information
submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the ANDA and
to the ability to market the generic drug,” because “the submissions are
not ‘routine submissions’ to the FDA, but instead are submissions that
are required to maintain FDA approval.”118 The majority asserted that:
[U]nlike Classen[,] where the patented studies performed were
not mandated by the FDA, the information here is not generated
voluntarily by the manufacturer but is generated by FDA
requirements the manufacturer is obligated under penalty of law
to follow . . . Under a proper construction of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), the fact that Amphastar’s testing is carried out to
‘satisfy the FDA’s requirements’ means it falls within the scope
of the safe harbor, even though the activity is carried out after
approval . . . Unlike Classen, where the allegedly infringing
activity ‘may’ have eventually led to an FDA submission, there is
no dispute in this case that Amphastar’s allegedly infringing
activities are carried out to ‘satisfy the FDA’s requirements.’119

The majority rejected the district court’s pre/post-approval
distinction because “Classen did not turn on this artificial distinction”
either.120
Additionally, the majority concluded that the safe harbor
provision is not limited to situations where the patented invention is the
only way to submit the information required by the FDA. The safe
harbor still applies even when there are non-infringing alternatives
available to the generic manufacturer.121
Judge Rader, in his lengthy dissent, disagreed with the majority’s
expansive interpretation of the safe harbor provision, arguing that “[t]his
expansion of the law circumvents the purpose of the law and ignores the
binding precedent of [Classen].”122 Rader lamented that “this result will
render worthless manufacturing test method patents.”123 He asserted that
the interpretation of § 271(e)(1) should rely on the legislative history of
the Act, not the plain language of the statute.124 In his argument, he
referenced Eli Lilly, where the Court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has
observed that the text alone of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) can be ‘not plainly
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comprehensible.’”125 In support of his argument for using the legislative
history to interpret the provision, Judge Rader referred to multiple
legislative history materials—such as House Reports, statements and
letters, and Congressional testimony—to show that the intended scope of
the Act was limited to only pre-approval testing necessary for FDA
approval.126
“Nowhere in the legislative history,” Judge Rader
concludes, “can this court find any mention of the post-approval,
continuous, commercial sales allowed by this decision.”127
He
suggested that “[s]pecifically, § 271(e)(1) won approval because it was
limited in time, quantity, and type,” and that “time” applies exclusively
to pre-marketing approval.128 He emphasized that the authors of the
Hatch-Waxman Act undoubtedly intended for the provision to be limited
in these ways. “In particular, the authors made clear that section
271(e)(1) would not apply to commercial sales, i.e., the ‘infringing’
product would not enter the market until after the patent’s life.”129
Judge Rader, who was himself was present during the drafting of
this Act, insisted that “[t]he authors of this section (and I hesitate to add
that I was present through this legislative process) did not imagine that
§ 271(e)(1) would allow continuous, commercial infringing sales during
any portion of the life of the patent.”130 His dissent suggested that the
majority’s opinion was completely contrary to Congress’s intent during
the legislative process, and the way the majority “rewr[ote]” the law will
allow Amphastar to infringe throughout the entire life of Momenta’s
patent for commercial purposes, competing with Momenta.131 Judge
Rader further argued that the majority did not consider the word “solely”
in its interpretation of the statute.132 He suggested that Amphastar uses
the patented method for commercial purposes, not “solely” for
developing and submitting information to the FDA.133
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of
“submission.”134 Judge Rader argued that “[m]aintaining or keeping a
document has the exact opposite meaning of submitting a document. In
125
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other words, ‘submission’ means not really submitting anything – a
strange construction of an ‘unambiguous’ term.”135 He contended that
the statutory language and legislative history make it clear that its
intended scope is for pre-FDA-approval activity only.136 “Therefore, a
reading of all the words in the statute and a reading of those words in
light of their legislative history shows that § 271(e)(1) only permits a
limited amount of pre-approval experiments to obtain FDA approval.”137
In his analysis, Judge Rader relied on the Classen decision’s use of the
legislative history, as well as Supreme Court precedent.138 Rader fully
rejected the majority’s effort to distinguish Classen, highlighting that
Judge Moore’s dissent in Classen referenced the distinction between preand post-approval activities, while in this opinion he insisted that
Classen does not distinguish in this way.139 Additionally, the parties and
amici interpreted Classen to distinguish pre- and post-approval
activities.140 The dissent also expressed disapproval of the majority’s
characterization of activities mandated or not mandated by the FDA.141
Lastly, Judge Rader asserted that the majority opinion, unlike the
decision in Classen, went against the Supreme Court’s holdings in Eli
Lilly and Merck.142 Those cases dealt only with pre-approval activity and
submissions, and the majority “takes phrases from those opinions out of
context to allege that its new interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is
consistent with those cases.”143
After the Federal Circuit decided Momenta in August, Momenta
filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Momenta argued that the panel
decision in Momenta is contrary to Classen.144 Momenta suggested that
“[t]he panel’s interpretation expands Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor into
a safe ocean,” even though “nothing in the text or purpose of Section
271(e)(1) warrants the panel’s expansive reading.”145 The petition
highlighted the inconsistencies between the Classen and Momenta
decisions and relied on Judge Rader’s arguments in dissent in
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Momenta.146 In addition, Momenta’s petition detailed the implications of
this uncertainty as to the scope of the safe harbor provision, making it
necessary for the court to resolve the inconsistency.147 In September,
shortly after Momenta filed this petition, Classen Immunotherapies
submitted a brief of amicus curiae in support of Momenta’s petition for
rehearing en banc.148 In its brief, Classen urged the Federal Circuit to
reevaluate the outcome in Momenta by suggesting that the outcome was
in “direct and irreconcilable conflict with the decision” in Classen and by
discussing the impact it will have on whether the Supreme Court grants
certiorari in the Classen case.149 Classen insisted “the two decisions
cannot logically coexist, because Section 271(e)(1) cannot
simultaneously be restricted to protecting only pre-marketing uses of
patented invention as it was written, and also be expanded to protect
some post-marketing activities.”150 Classen argued that the effect of the
Momenta decision is contrary to the purpose of patent laws.151 Despite
Momenta’s petition and Classen’s amicus brief urging the Federal
Circuit to reevaluate the panel’s decision in Momenta, its petition for
rehearing en banc was denied on November 20, 2012.152
As noted, GlaxoSmithKline filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Classen.153 In
December of 2012, the United States submitted an amicus brief
discouraging the Supreme Court from granting the petition for
certiorari.154 Although the United States expressed its view that the
Federal Circuit erred in the Classen decision, it concluded that “there is
no longer any practical need for this Court’s intervention in light of the
Federal Circuit’s subsequent decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.”155 The brief detailed the reasons
the Federal Circuit’s Momenta decision came out correctly, suggesting
that:
146
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Congress not only contemplated that drug manufacturers would
conduct post-approval scientific studies and clinical trials, but
specifically authorized the FDA to require such studies in a
variety of circumstances. If such post-approval studies involve
the use of patented inventions solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information to the FDA,
the plain language of Section 271(e)(1) precludes any claim for
patent infringement.156

The United States’ reasoning relied primarily on the plain-language
interpretation of the safe harbor provision, noting that “nothing in the
language of the statute links the availability of Section 271(e)(1)’s safe
harbor to the timing of FDA marketing approval.”157 The brief addressed
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Merck and Eli Lilly and determined
that they do not allow the court of appeals to conclude that the safe
harbor only protects pre-approval activity.158 Despite the United States’
in-depth reasoning about why the Federal Circuit came to the wrong
conclusion in Classen, the United States ultimately determined that there
was no need for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari given the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Momenta, and accepted Momenta’s narrow
interpretation of Classen. On January 14, 2013, the Supreme Court of
the United States denied the petition for certiorari.159 The Supreme Court
had another opportunity to address the issue when Momenta filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Despite the need for
Supreme Court review, Momenta’s petition was denied on June 24,
2013.160 The Supreme Court did not give a reason for refusing to grant
certiorari.161
III. ANALYSIS
The inconsistent decisions in Classen and Momenta have created an
intra-circuit split within the Federal Circuit. The two cases are far too
similar to produce such disparate outcomes. Although the majority in
Momenta briefly attempted to distinguish the Classen decision, this was
a half-hearted attempt detailed in only a few sentences. The majority
suggested that its decision in Momenta fits within a narrowly construed
156
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Classen opinion, arguing that “the submissions are not ‘routine
submissions’ to the FDA, but instead are submissions that are required to
maintain FDA approval.”162 It also highlighted that, “unlike Classen[,]
where the patented studies performed were not mandated by the FDA,
the information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufacturer but
is generated by FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated under
penalty of law to follow.”163 Here, the information was gathered for the
purpose of submitting information to the FDA as opposed to the
primarily non-FDA purposes in Classen,164
In dissent, Judge Rader disagreed with this reasoning, stating that
this decision “ignores the binding precedent of Classen.”165 Judge Rader,
who wrote the majority opinion in Classen, made it clear in his dissent
that he does not think the Momenta decision can be reconciled with the
outcome in Classen.166 There are explicit inconsistencies with the
court’s decisions. In addition, Judge Rader himself was present during
the drafting of the Hatch-Waxman Act. He witnessed firsthand the
discussions addressing the purposes of the Act and was aware of
Congress’s intentions regarding it. Judge Rader argued that the court
should primarily use the legislative history to interpret the scope of the
safe harbor provision, which he did in Classen, and that the majority in
Momenta was wrong for not considering it in their interpretation.167 The
legislative history clearly suggests that the scope of the safe harbor
provision was intended to be very limited in time and scope. The
purpose of the provision is to facilitate the lengthy FDA approval process
for generic manufacturers.168 The safe harbor provision is included in the
statute so that generic drugs can obtain FDA approval faster and more
easily, which suggests that the scope should be limited to activities
before the drug obtains approval from the FDA.169
The core of the issue lies in the proper method of interpreting the
statute. Courts generally look first at the plain language of a statute to
interpret its meaning.170 If there are no ambiguities in the wording of the
162
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text, the courts construe the meaning of the statute simply by looking at
the language used.171 However, if the court finds that there are
ambiguities in the plain language of the statute, it will usually look to
sources outside the text of the statute itself, such as the legislative
history, to determine what Congress intended the statute to mean.172 In
Classen, the majority found that there was ambiguity in the text of
§ 271(e)(1).173 The words “solely,” “reasonably related,” “development
and submission” and “federal law which regulates . . . drugs” are terms
that the Classen court argued were ambiguous and could not properly be
interpreted by looking exclusively at the words of the statute.174 For this
reason, the court found it necessary to look into the legislative history of
the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to better determine what Congress
intended those words to mean in the broader context of the statute as a
whole.175 As discussed, when the legislative history is taken into
consideration, it seems readily apparent that Congress intended
§ 271(e)(1) to be limited to information submitted to the FDA in order to
obtain FDA approval, and was not intended to cover infringing activities
after the drug gained approval.176 In this respect, Classen interpreted the
statute correctly.
In contrast, the Momenta majority found that the plain language of
§ 271(e)(1) is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, that the legislative
history should not be taken into account.177 This majority argued that the
legislature carefully picked the words used in the statute and
intentionally left out a pre- and post-approval distinction.178 If the
majority is correct that the statutory text is unambiguous, its method of
interpretation is also correct. Looking solely at the plain language of the
statute, in conjunction with later provisions in the Act, it is reasonable
that the statute can be interpreted as including any information kept by
the drug manufacturer for submission to the FDA, even if that
submission would occur after the drug was approved, and even if the
FDA does not actually mandate that the information be submitted. The
171
172
173
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words in the statute say nothing about the time frame of the submissions
and do not limit the scope of the submissions to be requirements under
the FDCA.179 Therefore, without looking into the congressional intent of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, the safe harbor does not appear to be limited to
pre-FDA-approval activities.
The issue then becomes which Federal Circuit panel properly
construed the safe harbor in this circumstance. This depends on whether
the language in the statute is ambiguous. Two panels of the Federal
Circuit came to two diametrically opposite conclusions as to whether the
safe harbor provision applies to post-approval activities.180 The panels
looked at the exact same language in § 271(e)(1), yet one determined that
it does not include post-approval activities, while the other argued that it
clearly does. Additionally, the Supreme Court has had to interpret the
language in § 271(e)(1) multiple times.181 That a statute can espouse so
many variant interpretations, regardless of the methods courts have used,
suggests its ambiguous nature. The legislative history is therefore a
necessary tool for courts in interpreting what Congress intended the
statute to mean.
Without considering the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the Momenta majority interpreted the scope of the safe harbor
provision too broadly.182 The majority used only the plain text of the
provision to analyze its meaning, without taking any of the legislative
intent or history into account.183 Momenta’s broad interpretation of the
safe harbor’s scope has serious implications for the pharmaceutical
industry. Allowing the safe harbor to extend to infringing activities after
the FDA has approved a drug may even extend farther than simply postapproval analytic testing to commercial uses. It would decrease the
incentive for brand-name pharmaceuticals to invest time and money into
research and development of new drugs.184 The purpose of the HatchWaxman Act was to strike a balance by increasing the market for
generics at cheaper prices while still leaving brand-name pharmaceutical
companies with incentives to invest in research and development of new
drugs. There is a fine line to maintaining this balance and a broad
interpretation of the scope of the safe harbor would likely skew in favor
179
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of generic manufacturers.185 This would disrupt the balance, especially if
generic companies could infringe on patents for producing their drug for
commercial purposes.186
However, although a broad interpretation of the scope of the safe
harbor would disrupt the balance sought by the creators of the HatchWaxman Act, an extremely narrow scope would also disrupt that balance
by making it an overly difficult and slow process to get generics on the
market, which would likely increase their costs.187 When interpreting the
scope of the safe harbor provision, the courts need to be mindful of the
underlying purposes of the Act.
The conflicting outcomes in Classen and Momenta create
uncertainty within the pharmaceutical industry and demonstrate the need
for courts to provide a uniform interpretation of the scope of the safe
harbor provision. The uncertainty as to which activities are covered
under the safe harbor is difficult for both the pioneer and generic
manufacturers. Generic manufacturers will not know if they are able to
use patented techniques to submit information to the FDA after their
ANDA has been approved.188 Pioneer drug manufacturers will be
hesitant to invest in developing techniques that may be used freely by
generic manufacturers for commercial use, which will compete with their
own drugs throughout the life of the patent.189 This uncertainty will
cause brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers to be wary of investing
large amounts of time and money on developing techniques that generic
manufacturers will use for commercial purposes after the drug is
approved by the FDA.
A resolution to this uncertainty is essential for the balance between
patent protection and ability for generics to enter the market. Ultimately,
there are multiple routes available to resolve the ambiguous scope of the
safe harbor. The ideal solution would have been to have the Supreme
Court weigh in and explicitly draw a distinction between pre- and postFDA-approval activities and make it clear whether or not they are
covered under the safe harbor provision. However, the Supreme Court
has refused to address the issue by denying both Classen’s and
Momenta’s petitions for certiorari. Without a Supreme Court decision to
resolve the issue, Congress may need to address the ambiguity in the
wording of the statute. Another option is action by the FDA itself. The
185
186
187
188
189
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FDA could create guidelines allowing or disallowing the safe harbor to
apply to post-approval activities.
A Supreme Court decision clarifying the scope of the safe harbor
provision would have be the fastest and most efficient way to provide
more certainty for the pharmaceutical industry by allowing
manufacturers to predict the outcome of future infringement cases. That
decision would have provided precedent for courts to follow in future
infringement cases and would create uniformity in those decisions. This
would have been the most immediate solution to the intra-circuit split
and would have postponed or eliminated the need for Congress to amend
the wording of the statute or for the FDA to create guidelines. However,
the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari for both cases,190 thereby
prolonging the uncertainty and creating the need for an alternate remedy.
As the issue stands currently, there is no precedent on which
pharmaceutical manufacturers can rely, and the outcomes of future cases
will vary.
Since the Supreme Court denied Momenta’s petition for certiorari,
Congress might need to address the issue by altering the text of the safe
harbor provision. Clearly there have been issues interpreting the
meaning of certain terms and phrases in § 271(e)(1) regarding both preand post-approval activities.191 The courts have not always taken the
legislative history and intent into account in their decisions, so Congress
may need to provide what the scope of the provision should be and alter
the language to make its intent more clear. Specifically, Congress could
choose to re-write the statute to explicitly state whether or not it applies
to post-FDA-approval activities. Since the uncertainty seems to lie in the
wording “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information,”192 that is naturally the most sensible starting
point for clarification. Congress could clarify by adding text explicitly
saying that the safe harbor applies only to pre-approval activities or that
it applies to any activities used to submit information to the FDA.
Alternatively, Congress could add an extra sentence following the
provision to make it apparent whether or not the safe harbor applies to
post-approval activities in addition to pre-approval activities. Either
approach would provide clarity for the pharmaceutical industry;
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however, it would be a lengthy process and would not provide an
immediate solution to the problem.193
Lastly, the FDA could write guidelines to clarify whether the scope
of the safe harbor encompasses post-FDA-approval activities. The FDA
routinely creates guidance documents for different areas of the food and
drug laws that it is tasked with regulating.194 While these guidelines do
not have a binding effect, reviewing courts will give them deference
because it is such a technical area.195 The FDA already has a category of
guidance documents for generics,196 so it could reasonably assess
whether the pharmaceutical industry should be guided in a particular
direction regarding the scope of the safe harbor provision and add a
guidance document discussing the suggested interpretation. This would
provide helpful guidance for pharmaceutical companies uncertain of
whether the safe harbor applies to post-FDA-approval activities.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers will most likely follow these guidelines,
knowing that courts will give deference to them.197 This would be the
most probable short-term solution since the Supreme Court is currently
unwilling to resolve this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conflicting Classen and Momenta decisions have emphasized
the struggle the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, are facing
interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision. These two cases have
made it clear that the scope of the safe harbor depends largely on
whether the court relies on the plain language of the statute—resulting in
a broad interpretation—or the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman
Act—leading to a much narrower interpretation. Classen and Momenta
each address whether the safe harbor extends to post-FDA-approval
activities; however, the Federal Circuit used the legislative history
approach in Classen and the plain language approach in Momenta,
193
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leading to essentially opposite outcomes. These two decisions have
created uncertainty as to the scope of the safe harbor and whether it
applies to post-FDA-approval activities, highlighting the need for a
uniform bright-line interpretation. The persistent lack of clarity is likely
to create major problems in the pharmaceutical industry, leading brandname manufacturers to be wary of spending large sums of money on
research and development of new drugs, while generic manufacturers
will be unsure of what constitutes infringement. Since the Court has
refused to clarify the scope of the safe harbor provision, either Congress
or, at a minimum, the FDA will have to step in and provide meaningful
guidance. Ultimately, the scope of the safe harbor provision will need to
be clarified in order to avoid the negative consequences that this
uncertainty will create in the pharmaceutical industry.

